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ABSTRACT
Purpose: Banana Bunchy Top Disease (BBTD) was ﬁrst reported in
Malawi in 1997. The major strategy used to deal with
BBTD required banana growers to uproot and burn all their
bananas and replace them with disease-free imported planting
materials. This had limited success only. This paper uses an actor-
oriented approach to explain this experience by assessing the
diﬀerent knowledge types and dynamics.
Design/methodology/approach: Using a qualitative study design
we sampled respondents through snowball and purposive
sampling. Focus group discussions and key informant interviews
were used to interview 120 farmers in 5 villages, 5 extension
experts, 6 crop scientists, 2 banana research scientists and 3 NGOs
leaders. Transcripts were analysed using Grounded Theory
Methodology.
Findings: The results showed that development agents and farmers
conceived of, and dealt with, BBTD on the basis of diﬀerent types of
knowledge and dynamics. The battle that arose around this
knowledge interface explains why the top-down approach to
dealing with BBTD led to resistance from banana growers. These
top-down approaches contrast with the widely-used rhetoric of
using bottom-up approaches to foster co-innovation.
Practical implications: Development actors need to embrace co-
innovation principles and move away from merely sticking to the
label of bottom up approaches.
Theoretical implications: Using participation as a means to achieve
predetermined strategies lead to failure and conﬂict in development
programmes while as consulting with, and listening to farmers has
potential to increase their cooperation in development
programmes.
Originality/value: The study informs that while there is so much
talk about a shift in extension approaches, not much has changed
to embrace co-innovation amongst actors.
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Introduction
Banana is a major food staple and income-generating crop for over 100 million people in
sub-Saharan Africa (Kumar and Hanna 2008). Banana Bunchy Top Disease (BBTD) is
recognized as the most devastating virus disease of banana (Dale 1987). BBTD is caused
by the Banana bunchy top virus (BBTV), a complex circular single stranded DNA virus
with multiple genomic components, belonging to the genus Babuvirus in the Nanoviridae
family (Niyongere et al. 2012). The symptoms of BBTD include development of morse
code streaking of variable length in the leaf veins, midribs and petioles; progressive
dwarﬁng of leaves and development of marginal leaf chlorosis, upright and crowded
leaves at the apex of the plant, hence the name bunchy top disease. The plants aﬀected by
the disease at an early stage are unable to produce bunches whereas those infected at a
later stage of growth produce bunches often of poor quality (Niyongere et al. 2012). Chlor-
ophyll content and growth diﬀerences between virus-infected and control plants are not
observed until 40–50 days after the plants are inoculated with viruliferous aphids (Hooks
et al. 2008). Hooks et al. (2008) adds that the incubation period of banana bunchy top
disease or appearance of symptoms ranges from 25 to 85 days after aphid inoculation.
BBTD was ﬁrst reported from the Fiji Islands in 1889, but its causal agent was not
identiﬁed until nearly 100 years later (Harding, Burns, and Dale 1991). To date, BBTD
has been recorded in about 33 countries in Africa, Asia, Australia and the South Paciﬁc
Islands (Amin et al. 2008; Kumar and Hanna 2008). BBTD aﬀects both industrial and sub-
sistence farmers. Although accurate estimates of yield losses are lacking for the Great
Lakes countries of Africa, about 90% yield loss was reported in severely BBTD-infected
plants of susceptible cultivars (Niyongere et al. 2013).
The ﬁrst cases of BBTD in Malawi were reported in 1997 and several eﬀorts have been
used to eradicate the disease (Kenyon, Brown, and Khonje 1997). These control measures
came gradually. Initially the research experts recommended restricting the movement of
planting materials, strict quarantine measures, slashing the infected plants in BBTD
infected areas. Later the message was changed to uprooting and burning all banana
plants, irrespective of whether they were attacked by BBTD or not. This uprooting was
supposed to be followed by a closed season of two years while disease free planting
materials were being multiplied locally. Additionally intensive farmer education pro-
grammes on controlling the disease with the use of insecticides were conducted (Qazi
2016). Despite all the eﬀorts, the disease hasn’t been eradicated and livelihoods have
been negatively aﬀected. Many districts in Malawi have been aﬀected by BBTD, including
those of Mulanje, Nkhatabay, Nkhotakota and Salima. It is a challenge to estimate ﬁgures
for the production area of bananas in Malawi, because the production systems of bananas
in most cases do not have well demarcated banana plantations. There are a lot of backyard
mats and in most cases mats spread sporadically in the ﬁeld or across ﬁeld boundaries
without any control. However, Thyolo district in Southern Malawi was unanimously
identiﬁed by key informants from both research and extension as the worst hit district
although there were no veriﬁable ﬁgures about hectarage to be used for the comparison.
BBTD caused huge economic losses and damaged many smallholder farmers’ livelihoods.
Due to the acute shortage of bananas in Malawi, the country resorted to importing
bananas from Tanzania to satisfy the local demand. This necessitated that BBTD be
dealt with as a matter of urgency.
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Several actors were involved in dealing with BBTD and introduced several mechan-
isms to cope with the disease, although with little success. This failure to completely
eradicate BBTD raises the question whether the approaches used provided an oppor-
tunity for all actors to co-innovate. In order for an innovation system to be successful
in meetings its goals, the objectives, strategies and actions of the diﬀerent actors
engaged need to be aligned (Segers et al. 2008). Long (1999) has pointed out that per-
ceptions of technical experts, extension workers and farmers about the aims of agricul-
tural development seldom completely coincide. The diﬀerences that exist amongst
them are not merely due to personal idiosyncrasies but reﬂect diﬀerent patterns of
socialization and professionalization, and can often result in miscommunication or a
clash of rationalities (see, e.g. Chambers, 1983; Box, 1984 in Long 1999). In this
study we examine how and why the technical-scientiﬁc knowledge of ‘experts’ and
the popular knowledge of farmers failed to coincide in the control of BBTD in
Thyolo District of Malawi. We use an interface analysis (Long 1999) to unravel the
roles of, and interactions, between farmers and researchers and extension experts as
their deliverers.
Theoretical framework
The notion of social interface oﬀers a way of exploring and understanding the issues of
diversity and conﬂict inherent in external interventions (Long 2001). Long (2001)
further argues that interfaces typically occur at diﬀerent points. Interfaces may occur
where diﬀerent, and often conﬂicting, life worlds or social ﬁelds intersect and more con-
cretely, in social situations or arenas in which interactions become oriented around pro-
blems of bridging, accommodating, segregating/contesting social, evaluative and cognitive
standpoints. In a healthy and eﬀective ‘innovation system’ there are strong ﬂows of infor-
mation and fruitful coalitions between key actors over time (Matsaert et al. 2005) and yet
this is not always the case.
The study examines the diﬀerent knowledge fronts of diﬀerent actors. Long (1999)
deﬁnes knowledge as a cognitive and social construction that results from, and is con-
stantly shaped by, the experiences, encounters and discontinuities that emerge at the
points of intersection between diﬀerent actors’ life worlds. Knowledge refers to the
broad variety of human activities, concepts and ways of being social, or the ‘knowledge
of doing’ (Krauss 2005). In a development arena, diﬀerences in knowledge inﬂuence the
outcome of confrontations between diﬀerent actors. However, knowledge is not evenly
distributed within populations and some actors have more knowledge than others. This
may be inﬂuenced by gender, class, age, occupation and social status and both the level
of knowledge and these attributes can inform the objectives and strategies of local
actors (Sardan Olivier 2005).
Knowledge is a social construct that is informed by the shifting of overlapping para-
digms that are constantly evolving. In their comprehensive overview of shifting paradigms
in rural development, Ellis and Biggs (2001) distinguished four main paradigms that
evolve in a non-linear, complex way, which are overlapping and interrelated. As a reaction
to the dual-economy approach of the 1950s, the ‘agricultural growth based on small-farm
eﬃciency’ paradigm led to the promotion of small-farm-ﬁrst approaches (see also Smalley
2013, 3). In the 1980s and 1990s, there was an evolution from a top-down, blueprint
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approach to a bottom-up, grassroots, or ‘process’ approach. This paradigm was based on
participatory processes designed to empower rural dwellers to decide on their own priori-
ties for change. From the 2000s onwards, the livelihoods paradigm took an open-ended
view of the combination of assets and activities that constitute viable livelihood strategies
for rural households (Parizeau 2015).
Blaikie (2000) has evaluated how these development paradigms were actualized. In
the classical approach to technical change, common in developing countries prior to
1970, research agendas were determined by scientists ex situ and local or indigenous
knowledge was entirely absent. The neo-liberal counter revolution, exempliﬁed in
the approach of the World Bank (1990–1995) prioritized the market, assumed that
local farmers are economically rational in their behaviour and that suitable technol-
ogies for development were available or could easily be devised. The contemporary
neo-populist paradigm shows a continuum of degrees in which local people participate
in problem identiﬁcation, research design and implementation. At one extreme, tech-
nologies are developed ex situ and are adapted through local ‘participation’ (Marglin
and Marglin 1990; Pimbert and Pretty 1994). Another position holds that local
people have their own eﬀective knowledge and resource use practices and that devel-
opment practitioners need to understand and evaluate the potential vitality and rel-
evance of these knowledge and management systems through extensive dialogue in
order to facilitate development (Blaikie et al. 1997). While this participatory rhetoric
is popular in theory the results of the interface between diﬀerent knowledge systems
shows that the potential of local knowledge is often not given equal weight when it
comes to making technological decisions (Corburn 2003). Although contemporary
scholars stress the value of ‘Traditional Ecological Knowledge’ (Berkes 2018) and
point at the importance of hybrid knowledge and ‘vernacular expertise’ to challenge
the exclusivity of scientiﬁc knowledge in development processes (Lowe et al. 2019),
many initiatives that promote technologies designed to foster rural development
don’t take these into account. Already in the 1990s, Blaikie et al. (1997) denounced
this lack of dialogue, consultation and on the ground research with local people, and
thus implicitly the negation of local knowledge and the de facto classic, linear
process of technology transfer approach.
This study explores the extent to which diﬀerent knowledge types and dynamics in
the development arena impacted on eradication eﬀorts of BBTD in Malawi. The study
presents an opportunity to understand the practices of actors involved in implementing
BBTD control interventions. While there is plenty of literature on biophysical strategies
for dealing with BBTD (Kumar et al. 2011; Omondi et al. 2017), there is a lack of detailed
sociological studies that identify and trace the types and dynamics of knowledge used by
actors involved in managing BBTD. Two research questions are addressed by this study.
Firstly, which actors were involved in BBTD control? In answering this question the
study has identiﬁed the key actors in the innovation system involved in the control of
BBTD, mapped the links and information ﬂows between them, and looked at how
these supported or inhibited BBTD initiatives. Secondly, what were the actors’ views
on and underlying knowledge about BBTD control? Here we have isolated the
diﬀerent views and knowledge types and dynamics of the diﬀerent actors. This
enabled us to understand the kind of relationships that existed between experts
and locals.
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Research methodology
Adopting an actor-oriented approach, we deployed a qualitative research design (Lyons
and Coyle 2016) to elicit the conﬂicting paradigms and knowledges present in the
control of BBTD. Data collection was spread over two periods. In September 2016, an
exploratory study (Stebbins 2001) was carried out to select the worst-hit district. The
exploratory study was done in three major banana growing districts: Mulanje, Thyolo
and Nkhatabay. The second ﬁeld work was conducted in November 2016 when we
carried out a series of semi-structured interviews. The target of our investigations was
Thyolo District where we interviewed banana growers, actors from extension and research
organizations. Chizinga and Muwata Villages in Mawonga Section were purposively
selected because Mawonga Section was the worst hit and it was also the only section
where uprooting of diseased plants and planting of imported disease free planting
materials had been implemented. So a whole range of activities and events of the BBTD
control programme were experienced in the research area. The interviews were recorded
and we have used quotes from these interviews to illustrate the arguments (Seidman 2013).
We used ethnographic techniques (Denscombe 2010; Scott and Garner 2013) to collect
data using focus group discussions (FGD) with farmer groups and key informant inter-
views with local leaders, extension workers, senior government oﬃcials involved in
research and extension, NGO oﬃcials, and representatives of BBTD management com-
mittees (see Table 1 below). Most of the interviews were done in groups of committees
Table 1. Interviewees, by location and aﬃliation.
Respondents Type of actor
Number of interviews/
respondents
Tool(s) used to collect
data
District Agricultural Development
Oﬃce (DADO), Thyolo
Extension specialists 5 Key informant
Interviews
Blantyre Agricultural Development
Division (BLADD)
Crop Scientists 6 Key informant
Interviews
Bvumbwe Agricultural Research
Station
Research Scientists 2 Key informant
Interviews
Mawonga Village Banana growing
farmers
17 FGD and Key informant
Interviews
Uprooting Committee
Members
9
Welekesi Village Banana-growing
farmers
15 FGD and Key informant
Interviews
Uprooting Committee
Members
8
Kalimtulo Village Banana-growing
farmers
14 FGD and Key informant
Interviews
Uprooting Committee
Members
8
Chizinja Village Banana-growing
farmers
16 FGD and Key informant
Interviews
Uprooting Committee
Members
7
Muwata Village Banana-growing
farmers
18 FGD and Key informant
Interviews
Uprooting Committee
Members
8
CARD NGO 2 Key informant
Interviews
Plan Malawi NGO 1 Key informant
Interviews
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but individuals were also interviewed. The extension worker and the local leaders were
interviewed individually. The summary of interviewees is presented in Table 1 below:
The questions asked were unstructured as only a checklist was prepared to understand
who were the actors, what roles they performed and how the farmers (re)acted in a par-
ticular situation and why. The interviews were recorded after obtaining consent from
respondents. Chichewa, the local language of the area was used to conduct interviews
in the villages. Interviews with other actors were done both in Chichewa and English.
Data analysis was done by use of Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM). GTM was
considered an appropriate approach and analysis method because it facilitates develop-
ment of a theory by means of continuous data collection and analysis, and allows theor-
etical concepts to emerge from the data without being inﬂuenced by predeﬁned frames of
previously existing theories (Braun and Clarke 2013; Kornilaki and Font 2019). GTM
involves the progressive identiﬁcation and integration of categories of meaning from
data and it is both the process of category identiﬁcation and integration (as method)
and its product (as theory) (https://www.mheducation.co.uk/openup/chapters/
9780335244492.pdf, 2019).
The process of data analysis involved familiarization with data through reviews,
reading, listening etc. The data was transcribed into narratives. Coding followed transcrip-
tion and later data was used to identify themes. Themes were then converted into cat-
egories. Relationships amongst categories were explored and later development of
theory and incorporation of pre-existing knowledge was done. Figure 1 below shows
how the analysis was carried out using Grounded Theory Methodology. Starting from
the qualitative data, and inspired by Strauss and Corbin (1998; as applied in Rogge,
Figure 1. The coding sequence in Grounded Theory: starting from a number of categories (deﬁned in
open coding), axial coding leads to clusters of meaning, that are combined into a meaningful general
narrative (selective coding) (source: authors).
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Dessein, and Gulinck 2011), we developed concepts, that were combined into interrelated
categories in a sequence of open, axial and selective coding, and in the end led to the
general narrative and theoretical concepts of the research.
The presentation of ﬁndings has been supported by quotes from interviews. In report-
ing the ﬁndings, depending on the data source, some actors have been reported from an
external point of view while in other cases it is the actors’ own perspective.
Results and discussion
The main actors involved in the control of BBTD and the knowledge dynamics
The study distinguishes between diﬀerent types of knowledge held by diﬀerent groups of
actors who were obliged to interact with each other in combatting the threat posed by
BBTD in Malawi.
The main actors involved in the management of BBTD were research and extension
experts, local leaders, farmers, Banana Bunchy Top Uprooting Committees, Community
Police and locally-active NGOs. The relationships amongst them varied, ranging from
long-established, trustful relations, to tensions and mistrust.
Research experts from the Bvumbwe Agricultural Research Station were in the fore-
front in passing on recommendations on ways to control BBTD through the existing
extension system to farmers. The Department of Agricultural Research in Malawi
(DARS) has several research stations and each station has a speciﬁc mandate. The
Bvumbwe Agricultural Research Station, which is, coincidentally, in Thyolo is respon-
sible for horticultural crops including bananas. So its scientiﬁc oﬃcers were well
placed to be involved in the control of BBTD. One of the strategies research experts
used was to take samples and test them in the laboratory to make ultimate recommen-
dations on BBTD. They also connected with development partners (such as the World
Bank) to provide support in developing a response. Since this was the ﬁrst time eﬀorts to
control BBTD were intensiﬁed, the networks with outside world were very useful to learn
how other countries/regions of the world had dealt with it. Research experts consulted
existing banana research networks such as the French Agricultural Research Centre for
International Development (CIRAD) to learn how BBTD had been controlled elsewhere.
Research took the lead in importing the new disease free planting materials. The
imported varieties were Williams and Grand naine (AAA genotypes) while the varieties
that were being replaced were Williams and Mulanje (AAA genotypes as well). The
disease free planting materials were supplied as a start-up, so they had to be multiplied
locally.
Extension experts from Thyolo District Agriculture Development Oﬃce (DADO) and
at the area level were involved at the ground level, interacting with farmers in controlling
the BBTD. The DADO has various subject matter specialists (SMS) including horticulture,
crop protection and extension. All these SMSs work through frontline extension (AEDOs)
workers who work in designated geographic areas. For the purpose of this study all the
SMSs and AEDOs are regarded as extension experts. They used diﬀerent means to com-
municate various messages to farmers in ways that were designed to be easily understand-
able to them. At the higher level, the Thyolo DADO is supported by the Blantyre
Agricultural Development Division (BLADD) with technical expertise in diﬀerent
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aspects of crop management and extension who also played a role in the management of
BBTD. The BLADD backstops several districts, including Thyolo.
Farmers were the major actors in the control of BBTD, as they were in charge of mana-
ging the banana plants. They were asked to uproot and burn all their banana plants, with
the promise that if they did so, they would be provided with imported disease-free banana
suckers. This uprooting and replacing of diseased bananas came as a last resort, after other
measures failed to eradicate BBTD. However, the abrupt and forced adoption of a see-
mingly new banana variety after uprooting was not a smooth process for several
reasons. Bananas in Thyolo are ‘territorialised complex goods’ (Landel, Gagnol, and
Oiry-Varacca 2014 in Dessein 2016): goods with an ensemble of often non-codiﬁed ‘ter-
ritorial attributes’, such as knowledge, emotions, beliefs, images and experiences that are
anchored in a speciﬁc area. Bananas are culturally embedded and loaded with symbolic
value as contributors to the pride and identity of local farmers and their belonging to
an area. Bananas are seen as belonging to the cosmological realms, and the planting of
bananas is regarded as a ritual to cure evil spirits, while uprooting them is thought to
lead to madness or death in the family. These beliefs contributed to households’ resistance
to uprooting banana mats, for fear of the consequences. By contrast, the characteristics of
the new varieties were unknown to the farmers and to grow them successfully the banana
farmers had to implement recommendations from the extension experts. The recommen-
dation to uproot and burn bananas gave rise to conﬂicts, as this ran against the cultural
meanings of bananas. At the same time, the districts’ reputation as a banana growing
area was being challenged by uprooting bananas. Thyolo used to receive many visitors
who came to buy bananas to resell in urban centres. This meant that there were also econ-
omic reasons for farmers not wanting to uproot and burn their bananas.
Local leaders were central to the control of BBTD. According to Margolies, Aberman,
and Gelli (2017) local leaders in Malawi play a primary role in establishing and maintain-
ing norms as well as in decision-making around community resource management. Local
leaders are the primary reference in shaping their subjects’ beliefs and actions, promoting
good conduct and establishing or enforcing shared customs. They are also responsible for
establishing and enforcing sanctions.
Like most of the banana growers, local leaders initially resisted cooperation with the
authorities. However, the extension experts (in consultation with research experts) facili-
tated a visit by village leaders to Bvumbwe Agricultural Research Station to see the disease
free planting materials that were being readied for distribution to villages that had
uprooted and burnt their old banana plants. The assumption was that once the local
leaders were convinced, they could easily get their subjects follow their commands. As
the common saying goes that ‘seeing is believing’, the visit to the research station
somehow convinced the local leaders of the availability of planting materials to be distrib-
uted after uprooting the infected bananas. Because of the conviction the local leaders had,
they ultimately became mediating ﬁgures between the farmers and extension workers.
Their support was crucial as local leaders in Malawi often act as an entry point for research
and extension experts to the village. They are the ﬁrst to be informed and convinced of the
need to mobilize their subjects to engage in development projects. Local leaders were also
responsible for sanctioning those farmers who resisted uprooting diseased bananas and
they accompanied the Uprooting Committees, to increase the pressure on the farmers
to uproot.
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Uprooting Committees: After their visit to Bvumbwe Agricultural Research Station, the
local leaders mobilized the villagers with the aim of building a common front for mana-
ging the disease. Informal Uprooting Committees were set up in each village with the
mandate of overseeing the uprooting and burning of bananas, irrespective of whether
or not they were infected. Often it turned out that the committee members themselves
were the ones who did the uprooting and burning. The villagers were promised that
once all the diseased bananas were uprooted each household would receive ﬁve disease
free imported planting materials which were multiplied locally. Although it appeared
that everybody was convinced of the gravity of the BBTD problem, there were many
farmers who either did not want or could not manage to uproot their bananas, and this
gave rise to tensions between farmers and the Uprooting Committees.
Community Police stood on the side-lines overseeing uncooperative farmers. It was
agreed in the village and communicated to all villagers that those farmers who resisted
having their bananas uprooted would be sanctioned by the Community Police. There
were two layers of the police involved. The ﬁrst layer were the community police fora,
composed of members of the village chosen to enforce law and order at the village
level. The second layer was the Malawi Police Service, which provided a back up to the
local Community Police. Members of the Community Police are trained by Malawi
Police Service and play a useful role in the community in enforcing the law without invol-
ving the police. The community police fora were initially set up in response to the low
police to citizen ratio in Malawi and to address the problems of policing remote rural
areas. In the case of BBTD, they were useful in handling cases of resistance to uprooting
banana mats. Farmers who resisted to uproot their mats were being sanctioned by the
Community Police who in turn referred cases to the Malawi Police Service for arbitration.
These layers of the police proved powerful enough to inﬂuence farmers to reconsider their
tough or uncooperative stance towards uprooting.
Non-Governmental Organizations. Surprisingly, the NGOs working in Thyolo District,
involved in various programmes to improve peoples’ livelihoods decided to not directly
take part in the control of BBTD. Churches Action in Relief and Development (CARD)
is one of the leading NGOs in the area that responded to BBTD in an indirect way.
Instead of looking for direct solutions to BBTD, it promoted livelihoods programmes
that focused on irrigation and growing of pigeon peas. CARD felt that these initiatives
would oﬀer banana-growing farmers alternative opportunities for raising money. Based
on our discussions we learnt that the NGOs in Thyolo focused on programmes that
aimed at bringing instant results as their annual funding cycles depended on achieving
yearly results and this precludes them from engaging in activities that only yield results
in the longer term, such as the BBTD control programme. NGOs did participate in distri-
bution of suckers, whose results could be seen within a short period of time but they did
not participate in the BBTD control programme, as eradication takes a long time and
results would only be visible in the long run.
Dynamics at the interface of the ﬁght against BBTD
The development arena of the ﬁght against BBTD harboured the diﬀerent actors with their
diﬀerent knowledge types and dynamics as outlined above. This section demonstrates how
the uprooting and replacing of bananas happened at the interface of diﬀerent actors’
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knowledges and how this aﬀected the process of co-innovation. The term co-innovation
has been used in this study to mean a new innovation paradigm where new ideas and
approaches from various internal and external sources are integrated in a platform to gen-
erate new organizational and shared values (Lee, Olson, and Trimi 2012).
The ‘expert system’
The position and practices of research and extension experts epitomized the classic trans-
fer-of-technology approach, with an attitude of blaming the farmers if they disregarded
scientiﬁc knowledge in their practices.
In the study area the researchers are non-rural actors who operate from ‘central places’
(both from the headquarters in the Capital, and the regional oﬃce, located in the district).
Researchers had periodic interactions with extension actors and made occasional visits to
rural areas. This approach closely followed the linear ‘Transfer of Technology’ paradigm
with researchers making recommendations to extension agents to pass on to farmers, who
were expected to adopt the new technologies. Research experts invited local leaders to the
research station where they were shown the imported banana plants which were being pre-
pared for distribution. On their return to the village, the local leaders were energized to
facilitate uprooting and burning. In the next step, researchers recommended intensiﬁed
quarantine measures for bananas which involved restricting the movement of banana
planting material from infected to disease-free areas. Researchers were also involved in
the introduction, production and distribution of clean planting materials through tissue
culture and indexing, through which germ plasma of local varieties was protected for
future usage and kept in green houses. Researchers also initiated disease resistance/toler-
ance variety screening trials and facilitated the importation of tissue culture plants from
France and South Africa. The selection of the varieties to be imported was made by
researchers in consultation with extension agents. Local farmers were not involved in
the selection of the cultivars to import. One researcher whom we interviewed emphatically
defended non-involvement of farmers as follows, ‘we [the researchers] had to choose the
varieties for import, considering high yielding and sweetness, because farmers don’t know
about this’.
The ToT-approach was also reﬂected in the communication and dissemination strat-
egies of the extension apparatus which provides the link between researchers and
farmers. The public awareness campaigns through mass media and village meetings
were selective and only targeted at areas aﬀected by BBTD. As a result, farmers from
other areas were unaware about the problem of BBTD and some acquired suckers from
aﬀected areas and planted them in their backyards and gardens, thereby unwittingly
spreading the disease. We found out that some NGOs operating in other districts (i.e. Pha-
lombe District) unwittingly bought suckers from infected areas and distributed them in a
virus-free area, also spreading the disease, as they were not linked to the expert knowledge
system.
A disregard of scientiﬁc knowledge
There had been very little research done on bananas in Malawi, partly because generally
research funds in the agriculture sector come from international donors that had not
shown any interest in banana researchIt is also known that banana is an orphan crop.
Orphan crops or ‘neglected or underutilized’, ‘minor’ or ‘promising’ crops are crops
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that have been overlooked by research, extension services and policy makers; governments
rarely allocate resources for their promotion and development (Tadele 2009, http://www.
fao.org/news/story/en/item/1032516/icode/2019). So bananas have always been neglected
while research into onions or sweet potatoes has received a lot of funding because of the
short term rewards.
This said, even the available scientiﬁc knowledge was often ignored. Although the
research experts backed up their recommendations with scientiﬁc arguments, these
were not reﬂected in the agronomic practices that they suggested. For example they rec-
ommended a quarantine period of just three months after uprooting and burning, even
though they were aware that the literature recommends two years (Qazi 2016) before
introducing disease free banana plants. In addition, the recommendation to maintain a
buﬀer zone of thirty metres (Niyongere et al. 2013) was violated. Disease free planting
materials were distributed at the village level, and were planted in some villages while adja-
cent village gardens had not yet uprooted their infested banana mats. Some farmers also
shared the disease free planting materials with farmers from villages, even when these vil-
lages had not yet uprooted and burnt their old bananas.
The ﬁndings showed that certain groups of actors, such as the extension experts and the
research experts, easily bond, as they are on the same side of the interface and share the
same type of ‘technical-scientiﬁc knowledge’ (TSK) (Sardan Olivier 2005). The acquisition
of this shared knowledge not only creates to a common language and shared frames of
reference, but also shared social and professional networks as these experts go through
a similar kind of education, frequent the same social networks and belong to related
bureaucratic and administrative systems.
These two groups are empowered by the TSK-complex when they enter the arena. It
allows them to impose their agenda, based on their science-based, but reductionist and
singular perspective on the BBTD problem: bananas needed to be uprooted and burnt
and be replaced with disease free plants imported into Malawi. Confronted with a
number of failed strategies to deal with BBTD, the research and extension experts saw
the newly-found way of uprooting, burning and replacing bananas as a science-based,
hence non-negotiable, panacea. They did not engage in negotiations or dialogue with
the locals, assuming that the latter had no alternative to accepting the logic of their
approach.
This reliance on the knowledge generated by the TSK-complex excludes some of the
arguments of local farmers which were based on lay, or popular, knowledge – referring
to experiences, taste, and ‘territorial attributes’ (Landel, Gagnol, and Oiry-Varacca 2014).
This suggests that researchers and extension experts are (still) stuck in the top down
approach although they claim to pursue a bottom up approach as promoted under the
District Agricultural Extension Services System (GoM 2006). Comments such as
‘farmers don’t know’ or ‘if you are illiterate, you cannot be knowledgeable’ demonstrate
how the representatives of the TSK-complex lack respect for other kinds of knowledge.
When selecting the new banana varieties, or deciding on the criteria for distributing the
new planting materials, the actors in the TSK complex did not seek any input from
farmers, thereby disregarding the role and knowledge of key actors in decision making.
Farmers’ interests were not articulated in these processes and the innovation was far
from inclusive (Crivits et al. 2014). This may have been an a priori source of farmers’
resistance to recommendations that were being made.
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According to extension experts, the practices of the farmers helped spread BBTD by
ignoring recommendations coming from the research and extension experts, because of
their illiteracy and not belonging to the TSK-complex. However, the popular knowledge
(Sardan Olivier 2005) of the farmers, based on generations of experience in and knowledge
gleaned from growing bananas, gave them the conﬁdence that they are skilled and knowl-
edgeable enough. Hence they considered themselves to be ‘farmer-experts’, and the
research and extension experts to be learners.
Blaming the farmers
Researchers and extension experts were often highly critical of banana farmers’ attitudes,
knowledge and practices and often resorted to ‘blaming the farmers’ when things did not
go as planned.
Research scientists believed that one of the causes of BBTD was poor husbandry prac-
tices. As one researcher remarked; ‘farmers were not following good husbandry practices:
some have big banana mats, as big as my oﬃce, against the recommendation of having 3 or
4 plants per mat’. One of the extension experts’ main tasks, acting as a link between
researchers and farmers in the ﬁght against BBTD, was to convince farmers of the serious-
ness of the BBTD problem. They often interpreted farmers’ resistance towards uprooting
and burning, as stubbornness, due to illiteracy, and often mocked farmers as ‘ignorant’.
One extension expert explained, while laughing: ‘you know, it was very hard to convince
the illiterate people in the villages… . At ﬁrst, they didn’t even know it was a problem’.
Local banana growers were sceptical of the measures proposed for controlling BBTD,
which was in part a reaction to the position and practices of research and extension
experts. Bananas mean a lot to the people of Mawonga, as one local resident said: ‘ever
since we were born we have been growing bananas, all our fathers did’. Almost every
household in the area had banana plants which were a source of food security as well
as cash income. Local farmers claimed that most of the improvements in their livelihoods
were banana-related: ‘the iron sheets on the houses are the result of bananas’. The farmers
expressed an attachment to their district-speciﬁc varieties, and wanted to hold on to them:
‘I want these banana varieties to be an inheritance to my children.’ They kept on saying
this even though they had not appreciated the new varieties that were being introduced
and that were in no way diﬀerent from what they had been growing.
Poor communication
While researchers didn’t invest much in banana (for the reasons discussed above) the
extension services connections with the research area were also very limited. With a
poor road network, limited electricity supply or, internet connectivity few extension
workers were willing to work in such deprived circumstances. Consequently, farmers
had become used to growing bananas without any technical advice and did not know
about or follow recommended husbandry practices. Growing too many banana plants
in one place (a very common observation in the study area) is illustrative of the local
lack of agronomic knowledge.
The ‘unseen costs’ of destroying bananas mats
The extension service expected farmers to act upon the recommendations from research-
ers that it delivered to them. However, the banana growers did not respond to the initial
12 K. MIKWAMBA ET AL.
advice to slash their bananas, arguing that the local varieties had a better taste and that
they had no alternatives. At the same time BBTD continued to spread over larger areas.
Later on, when the recommendation was changed to uprooting and burning all plants,
whether or not aﬀected, farmers’ resistance became more pronounced, revolving
around a number of arguments.
Firstly, some varieties of bananas were initially able to withstand BBTD and farmers
resisted uprooting these, although their immunity was only temporarily. While surviving
temporarily, these varieties also acted as carriers which were spreading the disease. The
growers believed that leaving the plant for as long as it is bearing a little fruit, was
better than uprooting it and harvesting nothing. Since in the words of one grower: ‘half
a loaf of bread is better than none’. Aware of the ﬁnancial consequences of uprooting,
also the poorly productive mats of bananas worried farmers. The decline in yields due
to BBTD meant that, in words of one farmer: ‘it has been a long time since some of us
have seen a K500 note’, but uprooting and destroying a mat would mean that this
meagre income would be completely lost. One farmer told us that ‘many farmers are
now working in tea and coﬀee estates, as a coping strategy to raise money for their
needs, even though the wages are low and the job opportunities are often far away’.
The locally active NGOs who were promoting the introduction of other crops also
faced farmer reluctance, as the skills and investments required to switch to irrigation
and pigeon pea farming were much higher than for banana cultivation.
Each household had many, and often large, mats of banana, and viewed bananas as a
wild crop, not requiring much husbandry, which they allowed to grow without any
control. Uprooting was a signiﬁcant and labour intensive job and farmers preferred to
use their time and energy in activities deemed more productive than digging up banana
mats that were dying anyway. Further resistance to uprooting and burning banana mats
came from the consideration that, aside from providing food and a cash income, they
also deliver multiple other beneﬁts: acting as a wind breaker against whirlwinds around
the homestead, a soil erosion control mechanism, as livestock feed, a provider of shade
and serving as living fences and/or indicators of boundaries. With some awareness of
the upcoming threats of climate change, some farmers conceived of BBTD as a result of
climate change, and hence didn’t believe the explanations provided by the extension
workers, leading to a general atmosphere of distrust between extension workers and
farmers.
The local leadership creates a breakthrough in ﬁghting BBTD
Local leaders were initially hesitant to spearhead the uprooting and burning of banana
plants. After their visit to Bvumbwe Agricultural Research Station they became more con-
vinced and, after experiencing some pressure from extension workers to lead the uproot-
ing and burning of bananas, they used their inﬂuence to persuade resisting farmers in their
villages to participate in the campaign.
With guidance from extension oﬃcers, the leaders mobilized and encouraged villagers
to eradicate BBTD once and for all. At village meetings the villagers were sensitized on the
eﬀects of BBTD and how to control it. Later on the villagers agreed to form committees to
deal with BBTD, following the recommendations from the researchers that came through
the extension service. In principle the Uprooting Committees were meant to oversee the
uprooting and burning by the banana growers themselves. However this did not go as
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planned, as there was so much resistance from the farmers. Being squeezed between
pressure from the extension oﬃcers, the danger of a loss of face for failing to implement
the recommendation, and the reluctance of farmers to uproot and burn their banana mats
the leaders ordered the committees to use force to uproot and burn the mats of resisting
farmers in order that the whole village could receive disease free planting materials. In
many instances, the presence of the Community Police was necessary to have the mats
uprooted. Those farmers that resisted stood by their banana crop and threatened to
harm anyone who dared come close to it. In such situations the Community Police led
the Uprooting Committee in uprooting the mats.
This caused some divisions in the local community. The Uprooting Committees saw
themselves as having the blessings of local leaders and the majority of the other villagers
to uproot and burn all the bananas in the village and sometimes became over-enthusiastic
in uprooting and burning mats, sometimes doing so without permission from the owners,
claiming that this was the only way that the village would receive the new banana plants.
The actions of the Uprooting Committees sometimes sparked local reactions and in some
instances, disgruntled villagers conﬁscated the Committees’ equipment or castigated and
mocked the committee members, as one committee member recalled: ‘they still mock us,
saying that they did not participate in uprooting the bananas and yet they still received the
new banana plants’.
NGOs: operating on the fringe of the development arena
NGOs operating in the study area only took part indirectly in the BBTD eradication and
replacement programme, despite the issue being identiﬁed as the main local priority in a
participatory scenario planning in disaster risk management conducted by the NGO
CARD. As their programmes did not include banana production the NGOs’ programmes
could not directly formulate a response to BBTD. Apart from using some funding to create
awareness meetings at district level, NGOs continued to work to promote irrigation and
other enterprises, irrespective of the gravity of the eﬀects of BBTD on peoples’ livelihoods.
In the village, the local leaders, the Uprooting Committees and the Community Police
aligned themselves with the extension and research experts, de facto approving their
opinions. These three groups were the ﬁrst to be in contact with research and extension
experts and became privileged clients of the research and extension apparatus. Although
their mutual relations are stronger than those with agents of the TSK, their frequent inter-
action with the research and extension agents, and the privileged relation that they devel-
oped with them, led them represent their ideas and become spokespersons of the TSK-
complex. After the local leaders were shown the suckers being readied for distribution,
they were motivated and pushed the Uprooting Committees and Community Police to
work harder. So communication and power diﬀerentials between locals and leaders
played a role in shaping the strategies employed. Following a ‘what is in it for me’-attitude
(Lindstad 2018), the Uprooting Committees and the Community Police may have worked
harder in the expectation that local leaders would share more suckers with them than with
the other villagers. The Uprooting Committees and the local leaders took on the role of
middlemen and brokers, bridging the social interface between the experts and the
farmers, and the Uprooting Committees satisﬁed the experts’ requests by uprooting the
bananas themselves and working closely with the local leaders. This relationship
between local leaders and the Uprooting Committee was not a new phenomenon, and
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also relies on the accumulating of more beneﬁts for themselves from free inputs distribu-
ted under the Farm Input Subsidy Program.
The local farmers who resisted the uprooting of bananas did so on the basis of their
popular knowledge and the cultural signiﬁcance of bananas rather than on the grounds
of scientiﬁc rationality or knowledge about BBTD. In addition, the year-long interaction
between the farmers and the research and extension experts in domains other than banana
cultivation, eroded the conﬁdence and trust that are fundamental in overcoming chal-
lenges of the social interface. This was intensiﬁed by the experts’ lack of transparency
in explaining their objectives which would, if better explained, have gone a long way to
fostering better mutual understanding and overcoming a barrier to agreement (Rogge,
Dessein, and Verhoeve 2013). The farmers had many experiences with government
oﬃcials and their free distribution programmes. For example, only a few farmers
beneﬁted from the Farm Input Subsidy Program in 2009 and more often the families of
the local leaders were the prime beneﬁciaries, with the beneﬁts trickling down and follow-
ing patterns of kinship and clientelism.
The BBTD disease spread slowly and gradually over a long period of time, disguising
the gravity of the problem. Farmers’ incomes declined very slowly so it was only after a
while that farmers realized the devastating eﬀect of BBTD. Their precarious livelihoods,
whose development is constrained by a lack of ﬁnancial and natural resources, meant
that they were unable or unwilling to develop a business-like approach toward banana cul-
tivation, as they were encouraged to do by the extension and research experts. The phrase
‘half a loaf of bread is better than none’ is illustrative of farmers’ attitudes and their will-
ingness to eke out a living at subsistence level with limited risks, rather than adopt a long
term, banana-based business development strategy.
Although there was some history of interaction between the farmers and experts over
a number of issues, the extension and research services had previously focused their
energies on bananas: banana husbandry relied on popular knowledge, which until
BBTD, was able to deal with the challenges that arose. The slow appearance of the
disease, generated a new set of interactions between the two groups, with a whole
machinery of experts entering the rural arena, facilitated by local leaders and their com-
mittees, who required the local population to uproot and burn a crop that was at the core
of their livelihoods and cultural identity. In such scenario, resistance to change was very
likely.
There was no direct response from locally-active NGOs to the BBTD crisis. They chose
to address the problems of reduced livelihoods caused by uprooting bananas by imple-
menting programmes that assumed that farmers would swiftly switch to other crops,
notably pigeon peas and horticultural crop production through irrigation, and be
willing to learn the necessary skills and make the required changes in management prac-
tices. This would have forced farmers to adopt a completely diﬀerent logic. While bananas
give a continuous yield throughout the year, the harvest of pigeon peas comes all at once,
easily leading to an oversupply. NGOs emphasized that their approach came about
because their plans and budgets are rigid and not ﬂexible enough to respond to emergen-
cies. The reality is that NGOs are stuck in a cycle of yearly reporting and funding renewals
that are based on them having achieved tangible results in relation to speciﬁed targets.
Banana growing did not ﬁt in with these requirements.
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Conclusions
This article has examined the emergence of BBTD in Thyolo District, Malawi, the relation-
ships between the diﬀerent actors involved and the subsequent battles that were based on
diﬀerent forms of knowledge and meaning. Data were collected and analysed in a rigorous
way. The major limitation of the study is that the data collection was carried out after the
uprooting of diseased banana plants and replanting with disease free planting materials; as
such it is possible that some of the information may have been missed because data were
only gathered afterwards. Probably if the study was done before and during the activities,
the results could have been slightly diﬀerent.
Despite this limitation, we have shown how diﬀerent kinds of knowledge, exempliﬁed
as technical-scientiﬁc knowledge and popular knowledge, co-existed and interacted with
each other with one clearly having a privileged position (Koutsouris 2008). Through the
combination of diﬀerent knowledges, all actors deﬁned the problem in their own way,
leading to diﬀerent kinds of solutions. The TSK system deﬁned BBTD as a technical
problem, requiring technical solutions. The solution of destroying and then replacing
the infected bananas was seen and presented as science-based, but little thought was
given to how this would be achieved or to possible sources of resistance. The extension
agents worked hard to package their messages in order to convince the farmers to
implement the researchers’ recommendations. But, when the farmers looked at the
beneﬁts they derived from the bananas, they were reluctant to uproot and burn the
bananas, hence giving rise to inevitable conﬂicts. The ﬁndings show an absence of
respect for social cultural values and farmers’ realities and of a willingness to integrate
these with scientiﬁc recommendations. Local leaders, who collaborated with the research
and extension agents could have played a key role as intermediaries here, but rather than
seeking to synthesize STK and popular knowledge, they used their power to enforce the
uprooting and burning, in the face of determined heavy resistance from the farmers.
Farmers’ refusal to uproot and burn their banana mats was misinterpreted as illiteracy
by the experts, rather than a refusal to enter into a relationship where there was a lack
of trust, transparency and respect.
While this study is focused on a speciﬁc incident in a speciﬁc area, broader lessons can
be drawn from it as it shows the importance of consulting with, and listening to, farmers in
situations like these. Farmers’ willing participation in this kind of initiative is paramount
and to achieve this they need to be actively engaged in dialogue about issues that aﬀect
their livelihoods. Understanding banana production systems and the signiﬁcance of
social cultural values could be a practical ﬁrst step towards co-innovation of control of
BBTD for all actors involved. This study shows that eﬀorts to transfer or disseminate
knowledge using the transfer of technology approach or false participatory methods
end up in rejections, and destroys any trust that might exist between experts and
farmers. The most eﬀective solutions for dealing with BBTD that would be acceptable
for farmers would have considered their views regarding the compatibility of the new tech-
nical solutions with prevailing management demands and wider social-cultural con-
ditions. This, in turn, implies that farmers must be able to set their own strategic goals,
participate actively, and build upon their own experiences and knowledge within a co-
innovation process which does justice to individual diﬀerences and qualities of people
(Koutsouris 2012). Koutsouris (2008) argues that there is need to provide local actors
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with the means to engage the management of complex and potentially risky situations, a
process that would enhance their capacity for autonomy and their ability to develop and
use technical, institutional and political means, empowering them to take purposeful
actions to shape their own futures. In this instance the dominant actors in the expert
system followed a ‘functional participation approach’ as argued by Cristóvão, Koehnen,
and Portela (2005) in which the extension service providers engage communities with
pre-packaged objectives and activities in the expectation that peoples’ problems will ﬁt
in with these predetermined objectives. This implies that experts should move from the
rhetoric of using participatory methods to a more inclusive agricultural innovation
system, based on co-innovation (Turner et al. 2016). Delivery of pluralistic and demand
driven extension services demands that there should be co-innovation amongst actors
through multi-stakeholder settings, such as Innovation Platforms (GoM 2006). It is rec-
ommended that future programmes and initiatives direct the diverse actors to explore
the beneﬁts of engaging in such Innovation Platforms.
Future research could usefully focus on understanding the complex knowledge
dynamics amongst the main brokers (the village chiefs and the Uprooting Committees)
that motivated them to align themselves; their actions with the experts from the research
and extension communities; and the possible pathways to direct actors towards multi-sta-
keholder Innovation Platforms.
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